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We propose that people typically reason about realistic situations using neither 
content-free syntactic inference rules nor representations of specific experiences. 
Rather, people reason using knowledge structures that we term pragmatic rea- 
soning schemas, which are generalized sets of rules defined in relation to classes 
of goals. Three experiments examined the impact of a “permission schema” on 
deductive reasoning. Experiment 1 demonstrated that by evoking the permission 
schema it is possible to facilitate performance in Wason’s selection paradigm for 
subjects who have had no experience with the specific content of the problems. 
Experiment 2 showed that a selection problem worded in terms of an abstract 
permission elicited better performance than one worded in terms of a concrete 
but arbitrary situation, providing evidence for an abstract permission schema that 
is free of domain-specific content. Experiment 3 provided evidence that evocation 
of a permission schema affects not only tasks requiring procedural knowledge, 
but also a linguistic rephrasing task requiring declarative knowledge. In particular, 
statements in the form ifp then q were rephrased into the form p on/y ifq with 
greater frequency for permission than for arbitrary statements, and rephrasings 
of permission statements produced a pattern of introduction of modals (must, 
can) totally unlike that observed for arbitrary conditional statements. Other prag- 
matic schemas, such as “causal” and “evidence” schemas can account for both 
linguistic and reasoning phenomena that alternative hypotheses fail to ex- 
plain. 0 1985 Academic Prcrs, Inc. 
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themselves are evident. A classic debate among both philosophers and 
psychologists concerns whether apparent fallacies directly reflect errors 
in the deductive process or indirectly reflect changes in the interpretation 
of the material from which one reasons. According to the latter view, 
“fallacies” in fact stem from interpretational changes such as the addition 
or omission of premises. It has been claimed that if such changes are 
taken into account, adults in fact reason in accord with formal logic 
(Henle, 1962). The above view assumes two components in the reasoning 
process: a deductive component that has context-free, syntactic rules 
comparable to those in formal logic and an interpretative component that 
maps statements in natural Ianguage onto syntactic rules in the deductive 
component. 
Despite abundant evidence for such interpretational changes (e.g., Fil- 
lenbaum, 1975, 1976; Geis & Zwicky, 1971), they in fact cannot fully 
account for typical patterns of errors produced by college students in 
deductive reasoning tasks (see Evans, 1982, for a review). Some of these 
patterns are inconsistent with any logical interpretation of the materials. 
One such line of evidence is based on Wason’s (1966) selection task. In 
this task subjects are informed that they will be shown cards that have 
numbers on one side and letters on the other, and are given a rule such 
as, “If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on 
the other.” Subjects are then presented with four cards, which might 
show an “A,” a “B,” a “4,” and a “7” and are asked to indicate all 
and only those cards that must be turned over to determine whether the 
rule is true or false. The correct answer in this example is to turn over 
the cards showing “A” and “7.” More generally, the rule used in such 
problems is a conditional, ifp then q, and the relevant cases are p and 
not-q. When presented in an “abstract” form, such as in the above ex- 
ample, typically less than 10% of college students produce the above 
answer. Subjects also rarely select in accord with a biconditional inter- 
pretation of the rule (i.e., p if and only if q), which requires that all four 
cards be turned over. Instead they often select patterns that are irrec- 
oncilable with any logical interpretation, such as “A” and “4” (i.e., p 
and q). One of the errors in the above answer is omission of the card 
showing “7,” indicating a failure to see the equivalence of a conditional 
statement and its contrapositive (i.e., “If a card does not have an even 
number on one side, then it does not have a vowel on the other”). Such 
systematic errors suggest that typical college students do commit fallacies 
due to errors in the deductive process, at least with “abstract” materials. 
Although subjects typically fail to reason correctly with “abstract” 
materials, they nonetheless seem capable of doing so with materials that 
have been characterized as “concrete,” “realistic,” or “thematic” (e.g., 
Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, & Legrenzi, 1972; Wason & Shapiro, 1971). 
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Reasoning performance has sometimes been shown to dramatically im- 
prove when the selection task is recast in such contexts (see Evans, 1982, 
Griggs, 1983, and Wason, 1983, for reviews). Johnson-Laird et al., for 
example, asked their subjects to pretend that they were postal workers 
sorting letters, and had to determine whether rules such as, “If a letter 
is sealed, then it has a 5d stamp on it,” were violated. The problem was 
cast in the frame of a selection task. The percentage of correct responses 
for this version was 81. In sharp contrast, only 15% of the same subjects 
produced the correct response when given the “card” version mentioned 
earlier. 
Despite these and other positive results, however, the search for the- 
matic facilitation has also been fraught with failures to replicate. To il- 
lustrate, although the postal rule problem mentioned above produced 
facilitation for British subjects in the 1972 study by Johnson-Laird et al., 
it produced no facilitation at all for American subjects studied by Griggs 
and Cox (1982). Golding (1981) found that the postal rule problem pro- 
duced facilitation for older British subjects who were familiar with a sim- 
ilar but now defunct postal regulation imposed by the British post office, 
but not for younger British subjects who were not as familiar with this 
rule. The pattern of replications suggested to some that the source of 
facilitation was prior experience with a rule, particularly prior experience 
with counterexamples to the rule. It has been argued that subjects familiar 
with the postal rule do well because the falsifying instance-a sealed but 
understamped envelope-would be available immediately in the subjects’ 
memory, prompting them to inspect the sealed envelope (p) and the un- 
derstamped envelope (not-q). Faced with the mass of evidence indicating 
illogical reasoning, several psychologists have recently hypothesized that 
people typically are not able to use rules of inference to reason, but 
instead use their memory of domain-specific experiences (e.g., Griggs & 
Cox, 1982; Manktelow & Evans, 1979; Reich & Ruth, 1982). 
The syntactic view has not been abandoned by all, however. Various 
theorists have proposed natural fogies which specify repertoires of in- 
ferential rules that people untutored in formal logic naturally use (Braine, 
1978; Braine, Reiser, & Rumain, 1984; Johnson-Laird, 1975; Osherson, 
1975; Rips, 1983). With respect to the connective if-then, every one of 
these repertoires proposed include modus ponens. Only one includes 
modus tollens (Osherson, 1975); however, others include reductio ad ab- 
surdum (an inference method which can be used to derive indirectly the 
same conclusion as follows from tollens) for some or all people (Braine, 
1978; Braine et al., 1984; Johnson-Laird, 1975; Rips, 1983). 
A different approach, which can be viewed as an attempt to merge the 
extreme positions represented by specific knowledge and abstract syn- 
tactic rules, has been taken by Johnson-Laird (1982, 1983). He proposed 
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that people possess a set of procedures for “modeling” the relations in 
deductive reasoning problems so as to reach conclusions about possible 
states of affairs given the current model of relations among elements. In 
Johnson-Laird’s theory, mental models are constructed using both gen- 
eral linguistic strategies for interpreting logical terms such as quantifiers 
and specific knowledge retrieved from memory. The modeling procedures 
themselves are formal and domain independent. Although Johnson- 
Laird’s theory differs from other accounts of reasoning in its performance 
aspects, it does not introduce novel types of knowledge structures. 
Critique of Two Current Theories 
To recapitulate, the view that people typically reason in accord with 
formal logic has been overwhelmingly refuted by evidence based on ex- 
periments in conditional reasoning. In its place two major views have 
been proposed: the specific-experience view and the natural-logic view. 
We find neither of these views entirely convincing. The inadequacies of 
each are discussed in turn. 
The specific-experience view faces two difficulties. First, remembered 
counterexamples do not always facilitate performance. In a series of four 
experiments, Manktelow and Evans (1979) failed to observe facilitation 
with conditional rules for which subjects were likely to have experienced 
counterexamples. The rules were arbitrary combinations of foods and 
drinks, such as, “If I eat haddock, then I drink gin.” It should be noted 
that although the particular combinations used were arbitrary, the general 
idea of selecting drinks based on the selection of food would presumably 
be familiar to most people, as would the foods and drinks themselves. A 
further problem with the above hypothesis is that prior experience does 
not seem to be required for facilitation. A version of the selection problem 
developed by D’Andrade (1982) involves an assistant at a department 
store who has to check sales receipts to ensure that receipts exceeding 
a certain value were initialed at the back by a section manager. Few 
subjects would be expected to have a counterexample to this rule readily 
available in memory. Yet the problem has reliably produced facilitation. 
Thus experience with a specific rule appears to be neither necessary nor 
sufficient to yield facilitation. 
A further problem with the specific memory approach is that subjects 
are prone to different types of errors on different types of problems. Reich 
and Ruth (1982) reported that with “symbolic” problems subjects tended 
to match the terms mentioned in the rule with those provided in the cards 
(disregarding negatives associated with those terms), whereas with “real- 
istic” problems they tended to verify the rule (i.e., selecting p and q). 
These two patterns of errors can be explained by neither the specific- 
experience approach nor the natural-logic approach. 
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The natural-logic view (as well as the syntactic view in general) as- 
sumes that when the invitation to infer the converse is taken into account, 
rules associated with the connective if-then are general across contexts. 
This assumption implies that any variation in performance that is logically 
unrelated to the invitation to infer the converse, such as the different 
patterns of errors just mentioned, either falls outside the scope of the 
theory, or contradicts it. Another type of variation in performance that 
is logically unrelated to the invitation to infer the converse is variation 
in the frequency of selecting the not-q case in a selection task. The natural 
logic view, by positing that some subjects do not have reductio or modus 
tollens available, can explain some subjects’ failure to select not-q. This 
view cannot, however, explain why the same subjects who fail to select 
nor-q in one context do select it in other contexts. 
These problems, and others that are raised in the General Discussion, 
beset any theory of conditional reasoning that assumes context-free in- 
ference rules associated with if-then. Therefore, a different approach 
seems warranted. 
Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas 
Our own approach is based on a type of knowledge structure qualita- 
tively different from those postulated by other theories of deductive rea- 
soning. We propose that people often reason using neither syntactic, con- 
text-free rules of inference, nor memory of specific experiences. Rather, 
they reason using abstract knowledge structures induced from ordinary 
life experiences, such as “permissions,” “obligations,” and “causa- 
tions.” Such knowledge structures are termed pragmatic reasoning sche- 
mas. A pragmatic reasoning schema consists of a set of generalized, 
context-sensitive rules which, unlike purely syntactic rules, are defined 
in terms of classes of goals (such as taking desirable actions or making 
predictions about possible future events) and relationships to these goals 
(such as cause and effect or precondition and allowable action). Although 
context-sensitive, the rules that comprise pragmatic schemas may extend 
beyond the scope of purely syntactic rules of logic, because they will 
serve to interpret “nonlogical” terms such as cause and predict as well 
as terms treated by formal logic, such as if-then and only-if. 
Although a syntactically based reasoning system tells us which infer- 
ences are valid, it does not tell us which inferences are useful among the 
potentially many that are valid. Consider, for example, the contrapositive 
transformation of the material conditional. Given the statement, “If two 
particles have like electrical charges, then they repel each other,” a logic- 
based reasoning system lets us infer the potentially useful conclusion, 
“If two particles do not repel each other, then they don’t have like elec- 
trical charges.” In contrast, given the statement, “If I have a headache, 
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then I should take some aspirin,” the same rule will produce the infer- 
ence, “If it’s not the case that I should take some aspirin, then I don’t 
have a headache,” which is hardly ever a useful inference to make. More 
generally, the fact that a problem exists creates the goal of finding a 
remedy for it; however, the absence of the need for a remedy does not 
create the goal of inferring the absence of a problem. Since people do 
not seem to make this type of useless inference, it seems that pragmatic 
goals must guide the process of inference. 
Our theoretical framework assumes that the role of prior experience in 
facilitation is in the induction and evocation of certain types of schemas. 
Not all schemas are facilitating, as becomes clear below. Some schemas 
lead to responses that correspond more closely than others with those 
that follow from the material conditional in formal logic. Performance as 
evaluated by the standard of formal logic depends on what type of schema 
is evoked, or whether any schema is evoked at all. 
An arbitrary rule, being unrelated to typical life experiences, will not 
reliably evoke any reasoning schemas. Subjects confronted with such a 
rule may attempt to interpret it in terms of a reasoning schema. Failing 
that, they would have to draw upon their knowledge of formal reasoning 
to arrive at a correct solution. Only a small percentage of college students 
apparently know the material conditional or can derive the contrapositive 
or modus tollens using reductio ad absurdum. Failing either, some might 
draw on some nonlogical strategy such as matching, as observed by Reich 
and Ruth (1982) and Manktelow and Evans (1979), among others. 
In contrast, some rules evoke schemas with structures that yield the 
same solutions as the material conditional (under circumstances expli- 
cated below). In particular, most of the thematic problems that have 
yielded facilitation tit a permission schema. The permission schema de- 
scribes a type of regulation in which taking a particular action requires 
satisfaction of a certain precondition. 
In standard propositional logic the deductive rules pertaining to if-then 
specify syntactic patterns based on the components if, then, not, and 
only $. For example, one rule states that ifp then q is equivalent to if 
not-q then not-p, where the symbols p and q represent any statements. 
The permission schema, in contrast, contains no context-free symbols 
such as p and q above. Instead, the inference patterns include as com- 
ponents the concepts of possibility, necessity, an action to be taken, and 
a precondition to be satisfied. (The deontic concepts of possibility and 
necessity are typically expressed in English by the modals can and must, 
respectively, and various synonyms, such as may and is required to.) 
The core of the permission schema can be succinctly summarized in 
four production rules, each of which specifies one of the four possible 
antecedent situations, assuming the occurrence or nonoccurence of the 
action and the precondition: 
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Rule 1: If the action is to be taken, then the precondition must be 
satisfied. 
Rule 2: If the action is not to be taken, then the precondition need not 
be satisfied. 
Rule 3: If the precondition is satisfied, then the action may be taken. 
Rule 4: If the precondition is not satisfied, then the action must not be 
taken. 
To understand when and why the permission schema facilitates selec- 
tion performance, compare the above rules to the four possible inference 
patterns of the material conditional. When a situation or problem evokes 
a permission schema, the entire set of rules comprising the schema be- 
comes available. Suppose the conditional rule in a given selection 
problem is in the form of Rule 1, such as “If one is to drink alcohol, then 
one must be over eighteen.” Rule 1 has the same effect as modus ponens. 
Rule 2, because it indicates that the precondition is irrelevant if the action 
is not taken (the precondition need not be satisfied, but may be anyway), 
effectively blocks the fallacy of Denying the Antecedent. Similarly, Rule 
3 indicates that if the precondition is satisfied, then the action is allowed 
but not dictated, thus blocking the fallacy of Affirming the Consequent. 
Finally, Rule 4 explicitly states that failure to satisfy the precondition 
precludes taking the action, an inference pattern corresponding to the 
contrapositive. A rule corresponding to the contrapositive is thus avail- 
able directly, rather than requiring an indirect derivation by means of 
reductio ad absurdurn. In sum, when a conditional statement in the form 
of Rule 1 evokes a permission schema, the solution derivable from the 
permission schema matches that required by the material conditional. 
Hence, the permission schema should be facilitative. 
This does not imply that the permission schema is equivalent to the 
material conditional in standard propositional logic. The permission 
schema is context-sensitive. In addition, as is discussed further in Ex- 
periment 3, the permission schema is directly related to deontic concepts 
such as must and may that cannot be expressed in standard propositional 
logic. Furthermore, the rules attached to reasoning schemas are often 
useful heuristics rather than strictly valid inferences. For example, Rule 
3 above does not logically follow from Rule 1, since it could yield a false 
conclusion if the precondition is necessary but not sufficient to render 
the action permissable (e.g., if a drinking law required drinkers to be both 
over 18 and free of recent drunk driving violations, then the inference 
“If a person is over eighteen, then he or she may drink alcohol” would 
not hold). Because reasoning schemas are not restricted to strictly valid 
rules, our approach is not equivalent to any proposed formal or natural 
logic of the conditional. 
Not all conditional reasoning schemas suggest the same solution to 
selection problems as does formal logic. A causal schema, for example, 
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will sometimes invite an assumption of the converse of a given conditional 
statement. (Assumption of the converse is to be distinguished here from 
the biconditional, which includes assumption of both the converse and 
its contrapositive.) A conditional, ifp then q, interpreted in the context 
of a causal schema may be represented as “If (cause), then (effect).” To 
the degree that only a single cause is perceived, the effect may be treated 
as evidence for concluding the presence or prior existence of the cause, 
yielding an inference in the opposite direction, “If (evidence), then (con- 
clusion).” Since events are sometimes perceived as having a single cause, 
problems evoking a causal schema are more likely to lead to the fallacy 
of Affirming the Consequent than problems evoking a permission schema. 
Alternative reasoning schemas may account for reported variations in 
performance on the selection task. As noted earlier, Reich and Ruth 
(1982) found that “realistic” sentences such as, “If a fruit is yellow, then 
it is ripe,” tended to lead to verification (selecting p and q), whereas 
arbitrary “symbolic” problems tended to lead to a matching strategy (also 
Manktelow & Evans, 1979). It seems that there may be a general “co- 
variation” schema, which can be applied to any situation in which two 
situations or events are for some reason expected to co-occur, as in Reich 
and Ruth’s “realistic” sentences. The covariation schema, like the causal 
schema, can be expected to invite an assumption of the converse of a 
given conditional statement and would lead to selection of p and q, the 
pattern observed for Reich and Ruth’s “realistic” sentences. Arbitrary 
rules, being unrelated to real-life experiences, may fail to evoke even a 
covariation schema for some subjects, so that these subjects must resort 
to an entirely nonlogical strategy. It is therefore possible that evocation 
of different reasoning schemas can account for variations in performance 
even among problems in which none of the dominant response patterns 
are consistent with formal logic. 
To summarize, we suggest that many inference schemas are pragmatic 
in nature, with the purposes of the set of rules being salient features of 
each schema. Because these purposes differ between schemas, they may 
serve to discriminate between types of schemas at the interpretative 
stage. Regulations such as permissions and obligations are imposed typ- 
ically by an authority to achieve some social purpose. In contrast, causal 
rules are not imposed by an authority, but simply serve to generate useful 
predictions about transitions between environmental states. Thus the pur- 
poses of the schemas are of different natures. As we see in Experiment 
1, provision of the purpose of a regulation constitutes a major cue for 
evocation of the permission schema. 
We propose that people typically make inferences based on pragmatic 
reasoning schemas. Whereas the logic approach assumes that an inter- 
pretative component maps statements onto particular context-free syn- 
PRAGMATIC REASONING SCHEMAS 399 
tactic inference rules comprising the deductive component, the schema 
approach assumes that the interpretative component maps statements 
onto a particular set of context-sensitive rules attached to the relevant 
schema. Such schemas vary in their degree of correspondence with the 
material conditional. The experiments reported below were designed to 
provide direct tests of the schema hypothesis. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
According to the schema hypothesis, failure on selection problems is 
due to failure to evoke a schema that corresponds well with the condi- 
tional in formal logic. A possible explanation for the conflicting results 
obtained with the envelope problem (discussed earlier) is that subjects 
who have had experience with the postal rule (or one that is highly similar 
to it) understand the rule in terms of a permission-one is permitted to 
seal an envelope only if it carries a certain amount of postage. In contrast, 
subjects who have not had any experience with such rules perceive it as 
being arbitrary. If people in fact reason using pragmatic reasoning sche- 
mas, then it may be possible to improve performance by evoking a fa- 
cilitating schema, such as the permission schema, without providing sub- 
jects with experience on specific rules. 
In the present experiment we attempted to evoke a permission schema 
by providing a rationale for conditional rules that may otherwise appear 
arbitrary. Two versions of each of two thematic problems were admin- 
istered to groups of college students: a version with a rationale and a 
version without it. If provision of a rationale succeeds in evoking a per- 
mission schema, then performance should generally be better in the ra- 
tionale than in the no-rationale condition. The two thematic problems 
were the envelope problem mentioned earlier, involving the rule: “If an 
envelope is sealed, then it must have a 20 cent stamp”; and a “cholera” 
problem, involving the rule: “If a passenger’s form says ‘Entering’ on 
one side, then the other side must include ‘cholera’.” 
In addition to varying the inclusion of a rationale, we also varied sub- 
jects’ prior experience with a rule by using subjects in Michigan and in 
Hong Kong. Whereas subjects in Michigan were not familiar with the 
postal rule, since no similar rule had been in effect in the United States, 
subjects in Hong Kong were familiar with it, since a similar rule was in 
effect until about 6 months before the experiment was run. Few of the 
subjects in either location would be expected to have had experience with 
the cholera rule. In general, those who have had experience with the 
rules should be able to perceive them as permissions, even though they 
may appear arbitrary to other subjects. The schema hypothesis therefore 
predicts that for the no-rationale condition only subjects in Hong Kong 
given the envelope problem would do well, but for the rationale condition 
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subjects in both Hong Kong and Michigan would do well on both thematic 
problems. 
In contrast, the syntactic view predicts that performance would be 
similar across all conditions, since the forms of the conditional statements 
were identical in the rationale and no-rationale versions for subjects in 
both places. Even allowing for differences in the tendency to invite the 
converse assumption, the syntactic view would still predict that the fre- 
quency of selecting the not-q case would be constant across conditions. 
The domain-specificity view also predicts that the rationale should have 
no effect. However, it predicts that the performance of Hong Kong sub- 
jects on the envelope problem should be superior to performance in all 
other conditions, since Hong Kong subjects alone were familiar with the 
postal rule. 
Method 
Subjects. Eighty-two students who were enrolled in an introductory psychology course 
at the Chinese University of Hong Kong participated in the experiment as partial fulfillment 
of the course requirement. Eighty-eight students at the University of Michigan participated 
in the experiment for the same reason. None of the participants had had any prior experi- 
ence with the selection task. 
Procedure. Subjects at each location were randomly assigned to two equal-sized groups. 
Each subject received one version of each of two thematic problems: a rationale version 
of one problem, and a no-rationale version of the other problem. Half of the subjects at 
each location received the rationale version of a problem, and the other half received the 
no-rationale version of the same problem. Subjects were run in groups of 8 to 10. All 
subjects were told to think carefully and solve the problems as best they could. To ensure 
that subjects arrived at the best answer they were capable of, they were allowed as much 
time as they needed, and were also allowed to make corrections. Subjects were encouraged 
to write brief explanations of their responses. As mentioned earlier, the two problems were 
the envelope problem and the cholera problem. The envelope problem preceded the cholera 
problem. For the Hong Kong subjects, who were bilingual, the rule in each problem was 
stated in both English and Chinese. 
Materinls. The no-rationale version of the envelope problem stated, “You are a postal 
clerk working in some foreign country. Part of your job is to go through letters to check 
the postage. The country’s postal regulation requires that if a letter is sealed, then it must 
carry a 20-cent stamp. In order to check that the regulation is followed, which of the 
following four envelopes would you turn over? Turn over only those that you need to check 
to be sure.” 
The above paragraph was followed by drawings of four envelopes, one carrying a 20-cent 
stamp, a second carrying a IO-cent stamp, a third one labeled “back of sealed envelope,” 
and a fourth one labeled “back of unsealed envelope.” 
The rationale version of the envelope problem was identical to the no-rationale version, 
except that the conditional rule (underscored) was immediately followed by the sentences: 
“The rationale for this regulation is to increase profit from persona1 mail, which is nearly 
always sealed. Sealed letters are defined as personal and must therefore carry more postage 
than unsealed letters.” 
The no-rationale version of the cholera problem stated “You are an immigration offrcer 
at the International Airport in Manila, capital of the Philippines. Among the documents you 
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FIG. 1. Percentage of subjects who solved the selection task correctly in each condition 
as a function of provision of a rationale (Experiment 1). 
have to check is a sheet called Form H. One side of this form indicates whether the pas- 
senger is entering the country or in transit, while the other side of the form lists names of 
tropical diseases. You have to make sure that if the form says ‘ENTERING’ on one side, 
then the other side includes cholera among the list of diseases. Which of the following forms 
would you have to turn over to check? Indicate only those that you need to check to be 
sure.” The above paragraph was followed by drawings of four cards. One of them carried 
the word “TRANSIT,” another carried the word “ENTERING,” a third listed “cholera, 
typhoid, hepatitis,” and a fourth listed “typhoid, hepatitis.” 
The rationale version of the cholera problem was identical to the no-rationale version 
except that instead of saying that the form listed names of tropical diseases, it said that the 
form listed inoculations the passenger had had in the past 6 months. In addition, the con- 
ditional rule (underscored) was followed by the sentence, “This is to ensure that entering 
passengers are protected against the disease.” 
Results 
Figure 1 presents the percentage of subjects who solved the selection 
problem in each condition. The pattern of results was precisely as pre- 
dicted by the schema hypothesis. The rationale versions produced uni- 
formly high success rates for subjects at both locations for both thematic 
problems, whereas the no-rationale versions produced a high success rate 
only for the envelope problem with Hong Kong subjects. The difference 
in frequency of correct solutions as a function of provision of a rationale 
was tested using the x2 statistic for each problem and subject group. 
Except for the envelope problem with the Hong Kong subjects, for whom 
the rationale was redundant as predicted, all conditions produced a sig- 
nificantly higher success rate for the rationale versions (p < .Ol for each 
of the 3 location-problem conditions). The frequency of successfully se- 
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letting the not-q case reflects the same pattern of performance as the 
frequency of solving the entire problem correctly. 
Performance levels for the no-rationale groups were higher in the 
present experiment than in other studies using subjects lacking experi- 
ence with similar rules (Griggs & Cox, 1982). It is difficult to interpret 
such differences in absolute performance levels across subject popula- 
tions. It may be that our subjects were sometimes able to provide their 
own implicit rationales for the stated rules even when none were provided 
by the experimenter. Our procedure of allowing for corrections might 
also have contributed to the higher performance level. 
The results of Experiment 1 provide clear support for the schema hy- 
pothesis. Since experience on the given domains did not differ between 
the rationale and the no-rationale groups, the effect of the rationales 
cannot be due to the amount of specilic experience. And since the syn- 
tactic form of the if-then rules remained constant across all conditions, 
the effect of the rationales cannot be accounted for by the syntactic view 
either. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
It might be argued that since the rationales in Experiment 1 were not 
content free, their introduction might have changed the nature of the 
relevant experience brought to bear on the problems. For example, al- 
though specific experience with the postal rule per se was not affected 
by introduction of the rationale, the idea of increasing profit-probably 
familiar to most subjects-may have prompted subjects to check enve- 
lopes carrying relatively small amounts of postage to ensure that they did 
not unduly reduce profit. Similarly, the idea of protection against a dis- 
ease may prompt subjects to check passengers unprotected against it. In 
both cases, the rationales may encourage checking the not-q case, the 
omission of which is a frequent error in selection problems. The relevant 
experience evoked by the rationales would extend beyond the specific 
conditional statements, but would nonetheless be content specific. 
To provide clearcut evidence for abstract schemas that are not bound 
to any domain-specific content, we tested performance on a selection 
problem that described a permission situation abstractly, with no refer- 
ence to any concrete content. Subjects were asked to check regulations 
that have the general form, “If one is to take action ‘A,’ then one must 
first satisfy precondition ‘P.’ ” To demonstrate that concreteness of the 
if-then rule, in the absence of a facilitating schema such as a permission, 
does not lead to logically correct responses, subjects were also tested on 
an arbitrary “card” version of the selection problem involving a rule 
specifying concrete entities. 
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Method 
Subjects. Forty-four University of Michigan undergraduates enrolled in psychology 
courses volunteered for the experiment. None of the students had had any previous ex- 
perience with the selection paradigm. 
Materials. Each subject was given two selection problems. One was an abstract descrip- 
tion of a permission, stating, “Suppose you are an authority checking whether or not people 
are obeying certain regulations. The regulations all have the general form, “If one is to 
take action ‘A,’ then one must first satisfy precondition ‘P.’ ” In other words, in order to 
be permitted to do “A”, one must first have fulfilled prerequisite “P.” The cards below 
contain information on four people: one side of the card indicates whether or not a person 
has taken action “A,” the other indicates whether or not the same individual has fulfilled 
precondition “P.” In order to check that a certain regulation is being followed, which of 
the cards below would you turn over? Turn over only those that you need to check to be 
sure.” 
The above instructions were followed by drawings of four cards stating the four possible 
cases: “has taken action A,” “has not taken action A,” “has fulfilled precondition P,” and 
“has not fulfilled precondition l?” 
The other problem involved an arbitrary card rule stating, “Below are four cards. Every 
card has a letter on one side and a number on the other. Your task is to decide which of 
the cards you need to turn over in order to find out whether or not a certain rule is being 
followed. The rule is: “If a card has an ‘A’ on one side, then it must have a ‘4’ on the other 
side. Turn over only those cards that you need to check to be sure.” Although this rule 
has often been labeled “abstract” in the literature, we would like to call attention to the 
distinction between the arbitrariness of the relation and the abstractness of the entities 
involved in the rule (Wason & Shapiro, 1971). The above rule specifies an arbitrary relation 
between specific, concrete entities. 
Drawings of four cards followed, showing four possible cases: “A,” “B,” “4,” and “7.” 
To more closely match the syntactic form of the cases in the permission problem, cases 
that negated terms in the if-r/ten rule were so indicated explicitly. The card showing “7” 
carried the caption “i.e., not ‘4,’ ” and the card showing “B” carried the caption “i.e., 
not ‘A.’ ” In addition, the modal musr was included in the arbitrary version of the rule to 
match the syntactic form of the permission rule. 
Procedure. Subjects were given the same general instructions for solving the problems 
as in Experiment 1, except that they were not allowed to change answers on a previous 
problem. Subjects were run in small groups. The ordering of the two problems was coun- 
terbalanced across subjects. The four cases to be selected in each problem were either 
ordered p, nor-p, q, not-q, or the reverse. Each subject received a different ordering of the 
cases in each problem. The ordering of the cases was counterbalanced across problems. 
Results and Discussion 
In order to assess performance on the permission and card problems 
independently of any transfer from one to the other, an analysis was 
performed on data from just the first problem solved by each subject. 
Although the permission problem was more abstract than the card 
problem, 61% of the subjects solved the permission problem correctly, 
whereas only 19% solved the card problem correctly, x*(l) = 7.76, p < 
.Ol. Since the permission problem made no reference to any domain- 
specific content, and the syntactic form of the if-then rules was matched 
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across the permission and card problems, superior performance on the 
permission problem provides strong evidence for the existence of an ab- 
stract permission schema. 
The effect of the ordering of the two problems did not approach sig- 
nificance; however, the card problem was more often solved correctly 
when it followed the permission problem (39%) than when it preceded it 
(19%), suggesting possible positive transfer. In contrast, the permission 
problem was less often solved correctly when it followed the card 
problem (48%) than when it preceded it (61%), suggesting possible neg- 
ative transfer. Collapsing over the two orders of the problems, 55% of 
the subjects solved the permission problem correctly, whereas only 30% 
of the same subjects solved the card problem correctly. This difference 
was significant when tested with a binomial test of symmetry @ = .Ol). 
The order of the four alternative choices had no significant effect on the 
frequency of solving a problem correctly. The frequency of successfully 
selecting the not-q case reflects the same pattern of performance as the 
frequency of solving the entire problem correctly. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
The knowledge contained in the permission schema should affect per- 
formance in other tasks besides the selection paradigm. For example, 
since rules in the schema govern and aid the rephrasing of sentences from 
it-then into only-if form and vice versa, such rephrasings of permission 
statements should follow certain consistent patterns, some of which cor- 
respond well with formal logic. In contrast, since transformations of ar- 
bitrary conditional statements are not guided by any rule that corresponds 
well with formal logic, performance on such rephrasings should be no 
different from chance. 
According to standard logic a conditional of the form ifp then q is 
equivalent to p only ifq, in the sense that the two statements have iden- 
tical truth tables. As Evans (1977) has noted, the only-if form stresses 
the necessity of the consequent-i.e., the fact that q must hold in order 
for p to be the case. The only-$-form is thus closely related to the con- 
trapositive of the if-then form (i.e., ij” not-q then not-p), which also em- 
phasizes the necessity of q. 
Because people do not in general use an inference rule equivalent to 
the contrapositive, we would expect them to have great difficulty in re- 
phrasing between if-then and only-if forms for arbitrary statements 
(Braine, 1978). There will be no rules to help them decide whether a 
statement in the form ifp then q should be rephrased into p only if q or 
its converse, q onfy ifp (and vice versa). 
In contrast, such rephrasings of permission statements should follow 
certain consistent patterns. Consider the following two possible rephras- 
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ings into only-if form of an if-then permission statement, “If the action 
is to be taken, then the precondition must be satisfied”: 
(5) The action is to be taken only if the precondition is satisfied. 
(6) The precondition must be satisfied only if the action is to be taken. 
Although only (5) is a valid rephrasing ((6) would be false if there were 
some other reason for the precondition being necessary), both are plau- 
sible inferences. Nonetheless, (5) is a more natural and direct inference 
than (6). A possible reason is that a statement in the form p only if q 
carries the connotation that 4 is necessary for p as well as prior to it in 
time (Evans, 1977; Evans & Newstead, 1977), both aspects of which are 
central to what it means to constitute a precondition or prerequisite. 
Hence, the form is highly compatible with the content in Statement (5), 
whereas Statement (6) carries the implication that taking the action is the 
prerequisite for the necessity of satisfying the precondition, which is a 
very circuitous way of saying, “If the action is not to be taken, then the 
precondition need not be satisfied.” There seems to be no natural way 
of stating a permission in an only-if form in which the precondition pre- 
cedes the action. It follows that subjects are more likely to produce State- 
ment (5) than Statement (6) (or corresponding variants) when asked to 
phrase a permission statement in an only-ifform. Since (5) is the strictly 
valid inference, it follows that subjects will appear to follow the dictates 
of formal logic in rephrasing a permission statement from if-then into 
only-if form. 
Such a difference in naturalness will not guide the rephrasing of per- 
mission statements in the reverse direction, from only-if form as in (5) 
into if-then form. Either the action or the precondition can be the ante- 
cedent of a permission statement in an if-then form without any awk- 
wardness. Rules 1 and 3 of the permission schema described in the in- 
troduction are examples of the two orderings, 
(1) If the action is to be taken, then the precondition must be satisfied. 
(3) If the precondition is satisfied, then the action may be taken. 
According to formal logic only (1) is a valid rephrasing of (5) (with the 
caveat that a deontic logic is required to account for the introduction of 
must in (1); see below); as noted in the introduction, (3) could be false if 
the stated precondition were necessary but not sufficient for the action. 
Nonetheless, both (1) and (3) are pragmatically plausible and natural in- 
ferences in most permission contexts. We therefore do not expect any 
difference in subjects’ propensity to produce the two forms of if-then 
sentences in our rephrasing task. It follows that for permission state- 
ments, subjects’ rephrasings will appear to follow the dictates of formal 
logic more closely when the direction is from if-then into only-if form 
rather than vice versa. This asymmetry is only apparent, however, in that 
the entire predicted response pattern follows from the nature of the in- 
formation contained in the permission schema. 
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The schema hypothesis also generates predictions about the introduc- 
tion of modals into rephrasings. The concept of permission is based on 
the deontic concepts of “possibility” and “necessity.” The modals that 
express these concepts allow inference patterns beyond the scope of stan- 
dard propositional logic. For example, applying a rule of standard prop- 
ositional logic to the permission statement, “A customer is to drink an 
alcoholic beverage only if she is at least eighteen,” we obtain the sup- 
posedly equivalent statement, “If a customer is to drink an alcoholic 
beverage, then she is at least eighteen.” However, this rephrasing is quite 
unnatural because it tends to be interpreted as a claim that drinking an 
alcoholic beverage causes the person to be 18. To maintain the sense of 
permission, it is much more natural to introduce the modal must into the 
consequent: “If a customer is to drink an alcoholic beverage, then she 
must be at least eighteen.” In contrast, introduction of the modal is not 
dictated for arbitrary statements, which are not interpreted deontically. 
For example, the statement, “A card has an ‘A’ on one side only if it 
has a ‘4’ on the other” can be rephrased as, “If a card has an ‘A’ on one 
side, then it has a ‘4’ on the other.” In this case introduction of must 
(“then it must have a ‘4’ on the other”) is unnecessary, since the original 
statement has no deontic implications. Accordingly, the schema hypoth- 
esis predicts that must will be introduced in rephrasing from only-ifto if- 
then form for permission statements but not for arbitrary statements. 
Similarly, can or its synonyms will be introduced in rephrasing from 
if-then to only-if form more often for permission than for arbitrary state- 
ments. For example, the alcohol rule discussed in the last paragraph is 
more naturally stated as, “A customer can drink alcohol only if she is at 
least eighteen,” rather than, “A customer drinks alcohol only if she is at 
least eighteen.” The modal can, or its synonyms such as may, is to, or 
is allowed to, serves to retain the sense of a social regulation. In contrast, 
arbitrary statements do not require any modal (e.g., “A card has an ‘A’ 
on one side only if it has a ‘4’ on the other”). 
Method 
Subjects. Fifty-two undergraduates at the University of Michigan, none of whom had 
prior experience with the selection task, served as subjects. 
Procedure. All subjects received four problems, two based on permission statements and 
two on arbitrary statements. One statement of each type was presented in if-then form and 
one in only-ifform. For each statement subjects first performed the standard selection task 
and then attempted to rephrase the statement into an alternative form (i.e., if-then into 
only-if or vice versa). 
Materials. In addition to the usual selection-task instructions, the first page of the booklet 
given to subjects explained that if--then statements can be rephrased into only-if form and 
vice versa. An arbitrary statement was used as an example: “If the tablecloth is brown, 
then the wall is white” corresponds to “The tablecloth is brown only if the wall is white.” 
The two permission statements were the “cholera” rule used in Experiment 1 (the ratio- 
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TABLE 1 
Percentage Correct on Selection Task (Experiment 3) 
Rule type 
Given form Permission Arbitrary Mean 
If-then 67 17 42 
Only-if 56 4 30 
Mean 62 11 
nale version), and the “alcohol” rule used above as an example. The arbitrary statements 
were the card problem and a “bird” problem, which in if--then form involved the statement, 
“If a bird has a purple spot underneath each wing, then it must build nests on the ground.” 
As this example illustrates, all statements included tnusr in their if-then forms in order to 
equate the syntactic structure of the permission and arbitrary statements.’ 
Each problem was presented on a separate page of the booklet. The selection task was 
presented at the top of each page. The basic statement was then repeated below, and 
subjects were asked to write the equivalent rephrasing in either if-then or only-if form. 
Which statements were presented in which form, and the order of the problems, were 
counterbalanced across subjects. 
Results and Discussion 
Selection task. Table 1 presents the percentage of subjects who gave 
logically correct responses in the selection task as a function of the type 
of rule (permission and arbitrary) and the form of the rule (if-then or only- 
ifi. The data were analyzed using analysis of variance. We will report the 
results collapsed across the two problems of each type, since the overall 
pattern held for the individual problems. 
As Table 1 indicates, subjects were far more accurate in choosing the 
two correct alternatives, p and not-q, for permission statements (62%) 
than for arbitrary statements (1 l%), F( 1,5 1) = 13 1, p < .OOl . This result 
is of course predicted by the hypothesis that people are able to apply a 
specialized schema to reason about permission statements. In addition, 
performance was more accurate when the rules were stated in if-then 
rather than only-ifform, F(1,51) = 5.22, p < .05. These two factors, the 
type and form of the rule, did not significantly interact. 
Rephrasing. According to the schema hypothesis, modals should be 
systematically introduced into rephrased permission statements to pre- 
serve their deontic sense, whereas modals will not be introduced into 
arbitrary statements. Moreover, whereas permission statements of the 
’ In a further experiment we compared selection-task performance for an arbitrary rule 
(the card problem) with or without must in the consequent. Performance did not differ 
across the alternative versions. 
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TABLE 2 
Percentage “Correct” Rephrasings, Including and Excluding Modals (Experiment 3) 
Permission Arbitrary 
Given form Modal No modal Total Modal No modal Total 
If-then 420 29 71 4” 33 37 
Only-if 316 11 42 6b 42 48 
a Can p only if q. 
b If p then must q. 
form ifp then must q should be readily rephrased into the form p onfy if 
q (or can p only ifq), permission statements of the form p only ifq would 
likely be rephrased into two modal forms: ifp then must q or Zf q then 
can p. Only the first of the two modal forms is a strictly valid inference 
from the original statement. 
Table 2 reports the percentage of subjects who rephrased rules of each 
type and form into forms in which p was ordered before q, with or without 
the inclusion of modals. This ordering of p and q corresponds to that 
dictated by formal logic, and hence will be referred to as “correct,” 
although we emphasize that within our schema framework certain forms 
that reverse the order of p and q also constitute pragmatically appropriate 
inferences. Two transformations from a statement in the form if p then q 
were scored as correct: p only if q (no modal) and can p only if q (with 
modal). Similarly, two transformations from a statement in the form p 
only i’q were scored as correct: Zfp then q (no modal) and ifp then must 
q (with modal). A response was thus scored as correct if the propositions 
p and q were placed as the antecedent and the consequent, regardless of 
the insertion or omission of the appropriate modal. Since there are only 
two possible permutations of p and q, subjects would be expected to 
achieve 50% accuracy if they ordered the propositions randomly. 
As Table 2 indicates, the rephrasing results were entirely in accord with 
the schema hypothesis. Arbitrary statements in either the if-then or the 
only-if form were not rephrased correctly with a frequency significantly 
different from the chance level of 50%. The interaction between the form 
of the given statement (if-then versus only-$) and its content (permission 
versus arbitrary) was highly significant, F(1,51) = 19.2, p < .OOl. Per- 
mission statements in if-then form were rephrased correctly significantly 
more often than arbitrary if-then statements, F(1,51) = 21.6, p < .OOl, 
whereas permission statements in only-if form were not rephrased cor- 
rectly more often than arbitrary statements.2 As predicted, only-if per- 
2 In an earlier experiment, essentially the same pattern of results for rephrasing from if- 
then into only-ifforms was obtained with subjects at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
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mission statements were often rephrased into the alternative form if 4 
then can p. This alternative rephrasing was produced in 38% of the cases 
for only-if permission statements versus only 2% of the only-if arbitrary 
statements. 
The data in Table 2 also reveal that among the correct rephrasings, 
modals tended to be introduced for permission but not for arbitrary state- 
ments. For if-then permission statements there was a nonsignificant ten- 
dency to introduce can or a synonym (i.e., can p only if q) more often 
than not, whereas for if-then arbitrary statements the correct rephrasings 
were much more likely to omit any modal, x*(l) = 11.8, p < .OOl. Sim- 
ilarly, for only-if permission statements correct rephrasings included a 
modal (i.e., ifp then must q) more often than not, x*(l) = 4.55, p < .05, 
whereas for only-if arbitrary statements correct rephrasings more often 
omitted any modal, x2(1) = 14.4, p < .OOl. Thus for both correct and 
incorrect rephrasings, modals were consistently inserted into transfor- 
mations of permission statements but not of arbitrary statements. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present results support the view that people typically reason using 
schematic knowledge structures that can be distinguished both from rep- 
resentations of specific experiences and from context-free syntactic in- 
ference rules. In Experiment 1, a rationale designed to evoke a permission 
schema facilitated performance on selection problems for which subjects 
lacked specific experience. Indeed, provision of a rationale raised per- 
formance to the same level of accuracy as did prior experience with the 
rule. Neither the specific-experience view nor the syntactic view can 
account for the observed performance pattern. 
Experiment 2 demonstrated that a selection problem based on an ab- 
stract statement of a permission rule, totally devoid of concrete content, 
produced substantially more accurate performance than did an arbitrary 
rule. This result is damaging to both the syntactic and the specific-ex- 
perience view. Finally, Experiment 3 provided evidence that evocation 
of a permission schema affects not only performance on the selection 
task, but also how subjects rephrased sentences from if-then into only-if 
forms and vice versa. In particular, statements in the form ifp then q 
were rephrased into the form p only if q much more frequently for per- 
mission than for arbitrary statements, and rephrasings of permission 
statements produced a pattern of introduction of modals (must, can) to- 
tally unlike that observed for arbitrary conditional statements that lack a 
deontic context. Again, neither of the alternative views can account for 
the observed pattern of results. 
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Comparison with Other Approaches 
Our results thus speak strongly for the existence of pragmatic schemas; 
the tindings are inexplicable according to either the specific-experience 
view or the syntactic view. Nonetheless, our findings need not be inter- 
preted as evidence against the very possibility of the two extreme modes 
of reasoning. It is conceivable that alternative knowledge structures rel- 
evant to deductive reasoning coexist within a population and even within 
an individual. Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Oliver (1985) propose a pos- 
sible set of relations between logical rules, specific experience, and prag- 
matic schemas. Although the three levels of knowledge structures may 
coexist, the apparent priority of the pragmatic level in reasoning has 
important implications for attempts to alter performance on reasoning 
tasks by direct instruction. Cheng et al. (1985) compared the impact on 
selection-task performance of purely formal logic training with that of 
training based on a pragmatic schema for obligation. They found that 
purely formal training was quite ineffectual, whereas instruction in the 
nature of obligations improved performance on a range of conditional 
rules that could be interpreted as expressing obligations. 
Other theorists have suggested that schemas (Rumelhart, 1980; 
Wason, 1983) or scenarios (Pollard, 1982) play a role in deductive rea- 
soning; however, previous discussions have said little about the types 
and nature of the information that might be included in such schemas or 
sceneries. One suggestion related to the present proposal is that perfor- 
mance on the selection task is facilitated if subjects are oriented toward 
checking for violations, rather than testing a hypothesis (See Griggs, 
1983; Yachanin & Tweney, 1982). The core of the permission schema, as 
well as of similar schemas for other types of regulations, indeed consists 
of procedural knowledge for assessing whether a type of rule is being 
followed or violated. However, the schema approach predicts that vio- 
lation checking will only lead to accurate performance if the problem 
evokes a schema specifying those situations that in fact constitute vio- 
lations. Asking subjects to check for violations in an otherwise arbitrary 
problem would not suffice, as Griggs (in press) and Yachanin (1985) have 
shown. In addition, the pattern of selections will only correspond to that 
required by formal logic if the schema yields the same solution as does 
the formal conditional. Although the permission schema does so when 
the given if-then statement is in the form of Rule 1, other regulation 
schemas have a different structure. For example, many obligations are 
pragmatically biconditional. Thus the rule, “If a child has reached age 
six, then he or she must enter school” may be given an “if and only if” 
interpretation, in which case the pattern of choices on a selection task 
will not correspond to that specified by the formal conditional, even if 
the subject checks for violations. 
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It is also clear from the results of Experiment 3 that the impact of the 
permission schema on performance is broader than simply encouraging 
violation checking. The rephrasing results indicate that evocation of the 
schema has consequences for a linguistic task involving declarative 
knowledge. Even if such declarative knowledge is derived from more 
basic procedural knowledge, performance on the linguistic task certainly 
goes beyond what could be described as orientation toward violation 
checking. 
We do not claim, however, that all variations in performance on rea- 
soning problems can be accounted for solely in terms of variations in the 
reasoning schemas evoked by different problems. For example, Wason 
and Green (1984) demonstrated that more accurate performance is ob- 
served when the selection task is simplified by only offering the subject 
alternatives based on the consequent (i.e., q and not-q), omitting those 
based on the antecedent. Wason and Green also found that subjects were 
more accurate when the rule related properties of a unitary object (e.g., 
“If the figure on the card is a triangle then it has been colored red”), 
rather than properties of disjoint objects (e.g., “All the triangles have a 
red patch above them”). The positive effects of such task manipulations 
are most likely due to decreases in the overall cognitive load imposed by 
the task. 
Causal Schemas and Linguistic Anomalies 
Although the present paper dealt most directly with the permission 
schema, we expect that a number of other schemas are used to reason 
about conditional rules. We have already mentioned schemas for obli- 
gations. An obligation is very similar to a permission except that the 
temporal direction is reversed. In a permission, performing an action 
requires satisfaction of a precondition, whereas in an obligation, a certain 
situation requires execution of a subsequent action. 
Outside of the realm of social regulations, the concept of “causation” 
appears to correspond to a family of reasoning schemas (Kelley, 1972, 
1973). There are very likely several subtypes of causal schemas, varying 
on such basic dimensions as whether the causal relation is deterministic 
or probabilistic and whether single or multiple causes are believed to 
produce the effect. In addition, as we noted earlier, schemas relating 
causes and their effects are closely related to schemas for “evidence” 
(e.g., an observed effect is evidence for the operation of its known cause). 
Schematic knowledge about causation and evidence can account for 
anomalies sometimes created by the contrapositive transformation (which 
changes statements in the form ifp then q into the form ifnot-q then not- 
p). Note the transformations of the following two sentences: 
(7) If the bomb explodes, then everyone will die. 
(8) If one takes proper care of a plant, then it grows. 
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They result in the following pragmatically anomalous contrapositives: 
(7a) If not everyone will die, then the bomb does not explode. 
@a) If a plant does not grow, then one does not take proper care of it. 
In contrast, the transformations of the following two sentences, 
(9) If there is smoke, then there is fire. 
(10) If one has been inoculated against cholera, then one is immune 
to it. 
result in meaningful contrapositives: 
(9a) If there is no tire, then there is no smoke. 
(10a) If one is not immune to cholera, then one has not been inoculated 
against it. 
No syntactic interpretation of the connective if-then in terms of either 
standard or natural logic can account for the difference in acceptability 
between (7a) and @a) on the one hand, and (9a) and (10a) on the other.3 
The temporal direction of if-then statements hypothesized by Evans and 
Newstead (1977)-although a factor in determining acceptability, as we 
shall see-also cannot fully account for the difference. Sentences (10) 
and (lOa), for example, are both acceptable, despite the antecedent and 
the consequent being ordered temporally in opposite directions. 
But let us consider the transformations in terms of pragmatic knowl- 
edge about causation, which could be represented by rules attached to a 
causal schema. The contrapositive transformation reverses the ante- 
cedent and the consequent of a conditional. The inference, “If (cause), 
then (effect),” in a causal schema has the contrapositive, “If (absence of 
effect), then (absence of cause),” where the absence of the effect serves 
as evidence for concluding the absence of the cause. The above two 
conditionals have a common temporal restriction involving the relative 
temporal order of cause and effect. When the cause and the effect are 
temporally ordered by world knowledge, as in Sentences (7), (8), and 
(lo), the event interpreted as the cause (or its absence) must temporally 
precede the effect (or its absence). Notice that this temporal restriction 
hinges on the semantic content of the events, regardless of which event 
is logically the antecedent or the consequent. Whereas the antecedent 
should be prior to the consequent in the conditional, “If (cause), then 
(effect),” the consequent should be prior to the antecedent in the con- 
ditional, “If (evidence: absence of effect), then (conclusion: absence of 
cause).” 
3 The anomalousness of (7a) and @a) can be avoided by changes of tense. For example, 
(7a) can be changed into “If not everyone dies, then the bomb did not explode.” Such 
adjustments, however, still cannot circumvent the issue of differences in acceptability, 
which can simply be rephrased as: Why do some contrapositive transformations require 
tense adjustment whereas others do not? 
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If the temporal order of a causal relation expressed in a conditional 
sentence violates the above restriction, the sentence will sound anoma- 
lous. This may occur in the contrapositive transformation of conditionals 
in which the antecedent and consequent are not temporally ordered by 
tense. In such cases, the if-then frame imposes a forward temporal di- 
rection on them (Evans & Beck, 1981; Evans & Newstead, 1977). Thus, 
the meaningful temporal order in Sentence (8), “If one takes proper care 
of a plant, then it grows,” becomes anomalously reversed upon trans- 
formation into Sentence (8a), “If the plant does not grow, then one does 
not take proper care of it.” Sentence (8a) suggests that the plant’s lack 
of growth (the supposed effect) precedes one’s failure to take proper care 
of it (the supposed cause). A similar anomalous reversal occurs in Sen- 
tence (7a). Notice that the anomalousness of Sentence (7a) disappears 
when the priority of the absence of the cause (the consequent) is specified 
by tense: “If not everyone will die, then the bomb is not exploding.” 
The remaining examples do not violate the above restriction. In the 
case of Sentence (9), “If there is smoke, then there is fire,” both tense 
and world knowledge indicate that the evidence and conclusion are con- 
tinuous and contemporaneous states. Since the events are contempora- 
neous, the contrapositive transformation causes no change in the tem- 
poral order, therefore yielding a meaningful Sentence in (9a). Sentence 
(lOa), “If one is not immune to cholera, then one has not been inoculated 
against it,” also does not violate the temporal restriction mentioned 
above, despite the events being temporally ordered by world knowledge. 
In this case explicit tense markers indicate that the conclusion temporally 
precedes the evidence, rendering the sentence meaningful. 
The above examples illustrate how pragmatic knowledge of causation 
can account for the differing effects of the contrapositive transformation. 
It is not the case that p must occur prior to q for statements in the form 
ifp then q in order to be acceptable. Rather, when the conditional ex- 
presses a temporally ordered causal relation, p must occur prior to q if 
p expresses the cause (or its absence), and the reverse if p expresses the 
effect (or its absence). This restriction does not apply when the events 
are contemporaneous. And as noted earlier, different temporal restric- 
tions apply if an if-then statement is interpreted in terms of a noncausal 
schema such as permission or obligation (also see Cheng et al., 1985). 
Conclusion 
In the present paper we have applied the concept of pragmatic rea- 
soning schemas to explain three different types of phenomena: the com- 
plex patterns of performance observed in Wason’s selection task, patterns 
of rephrasing between statements in if-then and only-if forms (including 
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introduction of modals), and linguistic anomalies involving the contra- 
positive transformation of certain causal statements. Our theoretical ap- 
proach has other potential directions for development. In other work 
(Cheng et al., 1985) we have interpreted the effects of alternative methods 
of training on deductive reasoning in terms of the pragmatic-schema hy- 
pothesis. 
Another direction that bears mention because of its perennial interest 
is the relationship between reasoning and language. Our approach to rea- 
soning implies that the schematic structures that guide everyday rea- 
soning are primarily the products of induction from recurring experience 
with classes of goal-related situations. Reasoning rules are fundamentally 
based on our pragmatic interpretations of situations, rather than on the 
syntactic interpretation of sentences. Our view thus diverges from the 
Whotfian hypothesis that thought is shaped by the language one speaks, 
particularly, it has been argued (Bloom, 1981), for such abstract concepts 
as the conditional. The results of Experiment 1 (as well as of the exper- 
iment mentioned in Footnote 2) in fact provide suggestive evidence in 
favor of our position. The Hong Kong subjects received conditional rules 
in Chinese, a language which (unlike English) has distinct colloquial con- 
nectives corresponding to the concepts ifand ifand only if(ruguojui and 
ruguo cai, respectively). A Whorlian might suppose that these expres- 
sions would allow Chinese speakers to distinguish more readily between 
these two confusable senses of if-then, and therefore perform more ac- 
curately on selection problems. However, no such advantage was de- 
tected in our experiments. Although these null results are far from con- 
clusive, there is certainly no convincing evidence that cross-linguistic 
syntactic differences in expression of conditionals have any impact on 
reasoning performance (Au, 1983; Cheng, 1985). Our framework implies 
that if reasoning performance is found to vary across populations, the 
explanation will lie not in linguistic differences, but rather in cultural 
differences regarding pragmatically important goals and situations. 
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